AcademicsWorking Papers

Uncertainty Aversion and A Theory of Incomplete Contract
Chenghu Ma
#001970 20131014 (published)
This paper is to provide a theoretical foundation of incomplete contract in an extensive game of multi-agent interaction. It aims to explain why rational agents may agree upon incomplete contracts even though it is costless to sign a complete one. It is argued that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. If agents’ attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral, then an incomplete contract as final solution can be the consequence of common knowledge of rationality. This paper assumes that all agents are uncertainty averse in a sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); and that agents can form coalitions as part of strategic play. All these are embedded into a newly proposed equilibrium solution concept for extensive form game of perfect information.
JEL-Codes: C70,C71,C72
Keywords: uncertainty aversion, strategic uncertainty, coalitionformation, stability and core-criterion.

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